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Like so many things like fireworks and chop-sticks, fortune cookies were invented by the 
Chinese in 1909 but not in Peking or Shanghai but in San Francisco. The real secret is 
the message on a slip of paper carefully hidden inside the cookie. Traditionally, the 
message is in the form of a proverb or prediction. They are all secret until the cookie is 
opened.  
http://www.fortune-cookies.co.uk/what_is_a_fortune_cookie.htm) 
 
 
A truly wise man never plays leapfrog with a unicorn. 
 
If at first you don’t succeed, redefine success. 
 
(http://www.new-year.co.uk/chinese/cookie.cfm) 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
China’s recent impressive entrance into the League of Trading Nations is met with the 
same awe and dread as the remarkable rise of Japan and the Asian Tigers, Pussycats and 
Flying Geese in earlier decades.  
In an historical perspective, China is now gradually regaining the position- that it held for 
centuries- as a dominant player in the World Economy. In the period 1820-1952, when 
world output and per capita income increased dramatically in the US, Europe and Japan, 
China's share of world GDP decreased from 1/3 to 1/20 and its real GDP per capita fell 
from parity to a quarter of the world average. China's bureaucratic system confined 
international trade and intellectual contacts. This self-imposed isolation undoubtedly 
explains why the country could not follow the pace of innovation and productivity of the 
emerging capitalist nations (Maddison 1998, pp. 14-15).        
It was not until the economic reforms, initiated in 1978, that the country started to 
witness economic growth well above the world average. The reforms were carried 
through gradually and in 1992 Deng Xiaoping defined a socialist market economy as a 
market system that is compatible with the ideals of socialism. This pragmatic view led to 
a further opening of the Chinese economy through trade liberalization, the welcoming of 
foreign direct investment and WTO membership in 2001. Since 1979, China's exports 
and imports have grown by 15 percent on average, compared to a 7 percent world 
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average growth. However, this growth record is not unprecedented as in the past Japan 
and some of the Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC) had higher export rates than 
China for more than 30 years (Prasad and Rumbaugh 2004, p. 1).  
Nevertheless, China's swelling exports towards the US and the EU elicit calls for 
protectionist measures. Being accused of preserving an unfair competitive advantage 
through the artificial undervaluation of its currency, China announced (21st July 2005) 
that the yuan would no longer be pegged to the US dollar but to a non-divulged basket of 
foreign currencies. It seems rather unlikely that the revaluation by 2.1 percent (from 
8.278 to 8.11 yuan per dollar) will substantially decrease the large bilateral trade deficits 
of the US and most EU countries. Actually, China's overall trade surplus is not extremely 
large as it runs substantial trade deficits with many of its Asian neighbours. Given the 
sheer size of the country, China accounts for a very substantial part of the growth of the 
world economy (e.g. almost a quarter of world growth over the period 2001-2004).   
In contrast with the general view that the yuan is indeed undervalued, existing studies 
provide a wide range of estimates with respect to China's equilibrium exchange rate that 
do not provide unambiguous conclusions (Prasad and Rumbaugh 2004; Special 2004 
issue on the yuan in China Economic Review Volume 15). The fact that China has a trade 
surplus with respect to most Western countries but a trade deficit with respect to many 
Asian countries seems to reflect outsourcing activities in Asia, with China focusing on 
the final processing and assembly of imports going from other Asian countries to 
Western countries, through China (Prasad and Rumbaugh 2004).  
 
An increasing number of people, mostly without economic declination, consider the fact 
that many industrialized countries are facing decreasing shares in world exports, to the 
benefit of emerging economies like China, as an unambiguous threat to their countries 
welfare.  
Krugman (1994) already dismissed former U.S. president Clinton’s view of nations as 
corporations competing in the global marketplace as “flatly” wrong and dangerous. In his 
view the term competitiveness does not apply to nations. He argues that shifts in world 
market shares should not be interpreted as an indicator of shifts in the international 
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competitiveness of countries but rather as an indicator of a shift towards a more efficient 
allocation of production factors in line with each country’s comparative advantage.         
Lall (2001) and Lall and Albaladejo (2004) counter-argue that although in theory 
international free trade is indeed a positive sum game that benefits all countries, the 
assumptions underlying the theoretical models are often unrealistic and simplifying (e.g. 
perfect competition, homogenous products, complete costless technology spillovers, no 
scale economies). Countries that do not unconditionally believe that all assumptions hold 
can actually improve national welfare through policies that remedy or play off market 
failures, e.g. by capitalizing on the monopoly power of domestic firms in foreign markets.   
Krugman (1996) acknowledges the theoretical sophistication of a “Strategist” view on 
international competitiveness but points out that most new trade theorists (e.g. Krugman 
himself) believe that the potential gains from trying to exploit market failures are small 
and that the subtlety of strategic trade theory is not likely to be a match for the turbidity 
of real world policies.     
 
Reviewing the empirical work of China's impact on the world economy, Prasad and 
Rumbaugh (2004) conclude that those Asian NIC that have a complementary trade 
pattern with China benefit from processing trade but that China could start to pose a 
“competitive threat” if it moves up the value-added chain. Some South(east) Asian 
countries will have to raise productivity and innovation to face China’s competing 
exports in labor-intensive products. With respect to the most developed countries the 
authors reason that these can gain from China’s emergence by shifting towards more 
skill- and capital-intensive activities (Prasad and Rumbaugh 2004, p. 13). Shafaeddin 
(2004) and Lall and Albaladejo (2004) also argue that countries with a comparative 
advantage in capital- and resource-intensive products are likely to benefit most from 
China's economic growth whereas countries with a comparative advantage in labour-
intensive products may suffer. 
 
Wong (2003) proposes a theoretical framework to analyze the potential impact of trade 
liberalization by China resulting from the obligations that follow from its WTO 
membership. Going beyond the rivalry between products of China and Southeast Asian 
 5
countries in third markets, the proposed model shows that China’s trade liberalization 
could affect terms of trade and thereby the trade volumes and welfare of other (Asian) 
countries. Wong points out that a more detailed analysis of China’s WTO membership 
should also take into account the substantial intra-industry trade between China and  
Southeast Asian countries as well as direct investment of these countries to China.    
 
Samuelson (2004) demonstrates how, in a Ricardian framework, in contrast with the 
traditional economist view, a country (e.g. the United States) may actually be negatively 
affected, even in the long-term, by an exogenous productivity gain in another country (e.g. 
China). He does not conclude that this warrants protectionism though, as this type of 
‘harmful’ innovation could very well be outbalanced by other types of innovations, 
leaving free trade to be preferred to “lobbyist-induced tariffs and quotas which involve 
both perversion of democracy and nonsubtle dead-weight distortion losses” Samuelson 
(2004, p. 143). 
 
However, some of the foregoing arguments show that although the “competitiveness” of 
nations is indeed a far more complicated and less self-evident issue than the 
“competitiveness” of corporations, a part of the shift in international trade volumes may 
actually reflect that some countries are losing market shares because of a decrease in 
attractiveness of their goods on the world market.  
 
In this paper a dynamic shift share analysis is performed for a group of nineteen (mostly 
OECD) countries. The computed market share effects are used as a proxy for the 
“competitiveness” of each individual country, which are then regressed on the 
“competitiveness” of other countries, e.g. China.  
The aim of the paper is limited, as a detailed analysis of the impact of China on other 
countries obviously calls for a more elaborated theoretical framework as well as an 
empirical methodology that is not subject to justifiable criticism as is a shift share 
analysis. However, I believe that the paper can offer some insight into which countries 
are, on average, most affected in the world market.  
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In section II some recent general trends in international trade are presented. Section III 
reports computed Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) measures to get some idea of 
the similarity in trade patterns between the countries considered. The actual shift share 
analysis is discussed in section IV. After having computed the market share effects in 
section IV, in section V these effects are used in a regression to estimate the sign and 
statistical significance of the impact of other countries. Finally, some concluding remarks 
are given in section VI.  
 
II. Recent General Trends in International Trade 
  
 
In 2004, developing countries gained a 31% share in world merchandise trade, 
unprecedented since 1950. The fact that even Africa has been performing well, with its 
exports increasing by 30% and its production expanding by 4% seems to warrant some 
optimism, although a substantial part of the good performance is explained by the rise in 
prices of raw materials (WTO 2005)
1
.  
 
Figure 1: Growth in volume of world merchandise trade and GDP (1994-2004) 
 
 
 
Source: WTO (2005). 
                                                 
1 Actually, the dramatic increase in China’s demand for raw materials explains a very large part of the 
increase in these prices. 
 7
As shown in figure 1, world merchandise exports and world GDP have recovered from 
the substantial 2001 slowdown, with world trade again increasing far more than world 
GDP.      
 
As shown in figure 2, Asia witnessed the highest growth in merchandise exports in 2004, 
fuelled by the export performance of China, Korea, Singapore and also to a lesser extent 
by Japan. South and Central America and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) also witnessed substantial growth in exports but in these regions imports clearly 
outstripped exports. Growth in exports of Africa and the Middle East, expressed in real 
terms, was far less impressive than growth in nominal terms explained by the 2004 surge 
in oil prices. For these countries the real growth in imports was more than twice real 
growth in exports. North America and Europe had real exports growth rates below the 
world average. The fact that Europe was the only region for which imports grew slower 
than exports probably reflects weak domestic demand in Western Europe. East European 
countries had growth rates in exports and imports well above the world average (WTO 
2005).    
 
Figure 2: Real merchandise trade growth by region (2004) 
 
 
 
Source: WTO (2005). 
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Looking at recent international trade flows of a selection of individual countries, table 1 
clearly shows the rather exceptional performance of China, ranking first, over the period 
1999-2004, in terms of growth in world merchandise exports share, world merchandise 
imports share and growth in the value of world merchandise exports. Poland, Hungary 
and Korea follow at a modest distance. Table 1 also reveals the substantial differences 
between OECD and EU15 countries, with Japan, the UK and the USA performing rather 
poorly in terms of growth in exports. The last column in table 1 shows the increase in the 
trade surplus over the period 1999-2004 relative to the 1999 value of exports. The latter 
provides a different ranking with China, given its high increase in imports, now 
somewhere in the middle and mostly EU15 countries topping the list, reflecting low 
domestic demand. 
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Table 1: Growth in country shares of total merchandise world trade (1999-2004) 
 
 
growth share exports growth share imports growth value exports growth relative trade surplus
China 0.90 China 1.11 China 2.04 Ireland 0.27
Poland 0.69 Hungary 0.32 Poland 1.70 Germany 0.24
Hungary 0.35 Poland 0.19 Hungary 1.17 Poland 0.17
Korea 0.11 Korea 0.17 Korea 0.77 Netherlands 0.12
Austria 0.10 Spain 0.15 Austria 0.75 Austria 0.09
Belgium 0.08 Belgium 0.09 Belgium 0.72 Sweden 0.08
Spain 0.07 Greece 0.09 Spain 0.71 Denmark 0.08
Germany 0.05 Austria 0.01 Germany 0.68 Belgium 0.04
Netherlands 0.03 Finland -0.01 Netherlands 0.64 Korea 0.04
Hong Kong -0.05 Italy -0.01 Hong Kong 0.52 China 0.01
Denmark -0.06 Netherlands -0.03 Denmark 0.50 Japan 0.01
Italy -0.08 Germany -0.06 Italy 0.47 Finland 0.00
Ireland -0.09 Hong Kong -0.06 Ireland 0.46 Hong Kong -0.01
Finland -0.09 France -0.08 Finland 0.45 Mexico -0.06
Sweden -0.11 Denmark -0.08 Sweden 0.43 France -0.07
Portugal -0.11 Japan -0.09 Portugal 0.43 Italy -0.08
France -0.13 United States -0.10 France 0.39 Hungary -0.08
Mexico -0.13 Sweden -0.11 Mexico 0.38 Portugal -0.14
Japan -0.15 UK -0.11 Japan 0.35 UK -0.23
Greece -0.17 Mexico -0.12 Greece 0.33 Spain -0.38
UK -0.21 Portugal -0.16 UK 0.27 United States -0.49
United States -0.26 Ireland -0.20 United States 0.18 Greece -1.70  
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from WTO Statistics Database. 
Note: Growth relative trade surplus is change of trade surplus between 1999 and 2004 relative to value of exports in 1999. 
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III. Comparative Advantage 
 
 
According to traditional trade theories countries can benefit from international trade by 
specializing in the production of those products for which they have a comparative 
advantage. Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) is a widely used- though not un-
discussed- empirical measure of comparative advantage (e.g. Bowen, Hollander and 
Viaene 1998): 
 
/
ij i
ij
j
X X
RCA
X X
   =        
 
 
Xij denotes country I’s exports in product J, i ij
j
X X=∑ ; j ij
i
X X=∑ and ij
i j
X X=∑∑ . 
If for a given product a country has a RCA greater than 1 that country is said to be, 
relatively to the reference group of countries, specialized in that good and vice versa for a 
RCA smaller than 1. 
For the empirical analysis in this paper data on exports were retrieved from the OECD 
International Trade by Commodities Statistics (2002/2) for the period 1991-2001. The 
data permits to create comparable time series for the period 1993-2000 for the following 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, UK and USA.  
Taking into account product heterogeneity, all calculations have been performed at the 
lowest level of aggregation, excluding Food and live animals (SITC 0); Beverages and 
tobacco (SITC 1); Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (SITC 2); Mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related materials (SITC 3) and Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 
(SITC 4). The highest level of product detail is the Standard International Trade 
Classification (Revision 3) five-digit level, except for a number of product categories 
which are only provided at the four-digit SITC level. The export value of a number of 
commodities oscillates wildly over the years or is dominated by a very small group of 
countries or even a single country. To avoid the bias of these commodities the following 
commodities were not considered for analysis: Spent fuel elements of nuclear reactors 
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(SITC 52517); Inuline (SITC 59216 ); Yarn of coarse animal hair or horsehair (SITC 
65115); Diamonds (excluding industrial), not mounted or set (SITC 6672); (semi) 
precious stones, not strung, mounted or set (SITC 6673); Fuel elements, non irradiated 
(SITC 71877);  Nuclear reactors (SITC 71871); Parts of nuclear reactors (SITC 71878); 
Tanks & armoured righting vehicles, motorized (SITC 89111); Military weapons- 
excluding revolvers, pistols, side arms (SITC 89112) and Side arms & parts thereof & 
scabbards & sheaths (SITC 89113) . 
Further excluding SITC categories like Intrastat: estimation of missing declarations of 
section; confidential trade; Sets of division; Components of complete industrial plants of 
division; Merchandises carried by post and not elsewhere specified; Special transactions 
and commodities not classified and Intra E.C trade not classified by commodities finally 
results in 2191 five-digit SITC commodities and 144 four-digit SITC commodities. 
 
For the reference group of nineteen countries, table 2 reports China’s twenty products 
with the highest RCA for 1994 and 2000
2
. 
 
Table 2: China's twenty products with highest RCA for 1994 and 2000 
Product RCA 1994 Product RCA 2000
67122  Non alloyed pig iron, weight > 0, 5% phosphorus 56.50 68724  Tin tubes, pipes and tube or pipe fittings 30.33
65844  Table linen, knitted or crocheted 54.38 67269  Other semi fin. prod., iron, non al. steel, <0, 25%ca. 23.03
65144  Sewing thread of artificial staple fibres 50.31 7863   Containers 18.14
65811  Sacks & bags, of textile bast fibres of heading 264 44.96 52229  Calcium, strontium & baryum; scandium & yttrium 17.01
89733  Articles of nat. or cultur. pearls, precious stones 44.62 84323  Jackets & blazers, knitted or crocheted, for men 15.28
67154  Ferro silico chromium 42.01 89478  Gymnasium or athletic articles & equipment 14.67
68993  Antimony & articles thereof incl. waste & scrap) 40.47 65192  Silk yarn (excluding spun), not put up for retail sale 14.51
68982  Cadmium, unwrought; cadmium waste & scrap; powders 37.62 67241  Ingots of iron (excluding 671339) or non alloy steel 14.03
65929  Carpets, floor coverings, knotted, other textile mat. 36.52 88112  Flashbulbs, flashcubes & the like 14.02
65921  Carpets, floor coverings, knotted, wool or fine hair 36.06 89974  Nats, matting & screens of vegetable materials 13.54
66711  Natural pearls, not strung, mounted or set 33.84 67154  Ferro silico chromium 13.47
84123  Ensembles, for men 32.00 69638  Parts, n.e.s., of non0electric razors, excluding plastics 13.37
88552  Watch movements, neither battery nor accum. powered 30.37 67122  Non alloyed pig iron, weight > 0, 5% phosphorus 13.33
65199  Yarn of other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn 28.30 89995  Wigs, false beard & simi.; art. of human hair, n.e.s. 12.55
83129  Trunks & similar, outer surface of other materials 27.23 67245  Other primary forms of iron or non alloy steel 12.47
89929  Artificial flowers, foliage, fruits, excludingof plastics 27.02 67121  Non alloyed pig iron, weight < 0, 5% phosphorus 12.08
89426  Toy musical instruments & apparatus 26.67 85123  Other sports footwear, uppers of rubbers or plast. 12.08
67123  Alloy pig iron and spiegeleisen 26.11 65193  Yarn spun from silk waste, not for retail sale 12.07
89971  Articles made directly to shape from plaiting mat. 26.00 89929  Artificial flowers, foliage, fruits, excludingof plastics 11.87
84849  Headgear, n.e.s., of materials excluding rubber or plas. 25.96 56293  Diammonium hydrogenorthophosphate 11.81  
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD (2002) 
 
                                                 
2 The RCA for individual countries are not reported but available upon request. 
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Non alloyed pig iron, weight > 0, 5% phosphorus ( SITC 67122), Ferro silico chromium 
(SITC 67154) and  Artificial flowers, foliage, fruits, excluding of plastics (SITC 89929) 
are the only three commodities that appear in the top 20 of both 1994 and 2000. 
Even at the 3 digit level only four groups overlap: Textile yarn (SITC 651), Pig iron & 
spiegeleisen, sponge iron, …(SITC 671); Baby carriages, toys, games & sporting goods 
(SITC 894) and Miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 899).  
The top RCA for 1994 are higher than those for 2000, reflecting the fact that China’s 
exports have become more diversified.  
 
In table 3 the correlation (Pearson and Spearman) between the RCA of China and the 
RCA of the other eighteen countries is given.  
 
Table 3: Correlation between RCA of China and given countries in 2000 
 Pearson Spearman 
AUSTRIA -0.07** -0.02 
BELGIUM -0.06** -0.02 
CANADA -0.10** -0.12** 
DENMARK -0.04* 0.11** 
FINLAND -0.10** -0.04 
FRANCE -0.16** -0.13** 
GERMANY -0.28** -0.29** 
HONG KONG 0.22** 0.26** 
HUNGARY 0.01 0.17** 
IRELAND -0.05* 0.09** 
ITALY -0.04* 0.07** 
JAPAN -0.15** -0.13** 
NETHERLANDS -0.10** -0.05* 
POLAND 0.11** 0.13** 
SPAIN -0.05* 0.06** 
SWEDEN -0.14** -0.12** 
UK -0.15** -0.08** 
USA -0.20** -0.24** 
Note: **, * denotes significance (two-sided) at 
respectively the 0.01 and the 0.05 level.  
 
Hong Kong, Hungary and Poland are the only countries with both a positive Pearson and 
Spearman correlation. Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Spain have a negative Pearson 
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correlation coefficient but a positive Spearman correlation coefficient with for all four 
countries the Spearman correlation being more significant than Pearson correlation.  For 
the other countries all correlation coefficients are negative. 
 
Using the RCA computed for all individual countries, figure 3 maps the similarity in 
export specialization between the countries of the reference group for the year 2000. The 
common space has been created with the multidimensional scaling procedure 
PROXSCAL in SPSS 12. Not too surprisingly Hong Kong is closest to China. Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy and Spain are also close to China, in line with the significantly positive 
Spearman correlation. On the other hand Hungary and Poland are rather distanced from 
China in the common space, in spite of a positive Pearson and Spearman correlation.  
 
Figure 3: Common space reflecting similarity in RCA (2000)  
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Note: The figure is a common space obtained by running the 
multidimensional scaling procedure PROXSCAL in SPSS. The RCA 
for the reference group of nineteen countries are used to estimate the 
distance between the countries considered. 
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IV. Shifting Shares 
 
 
The computed revealed comparative advantage measures, reported in the previous section, 
suggest little similarity in export specialization between China and most OECD countries. 
However, this does not necessarily imply that the exports of China do not have an impact 
on the market shares of these countries. Lall and Albaladejo (2004) assess the potential 
competitive threat of China with respect to its Asian neighbours by examining the degree 
to which the sign of changes in market shares of products of China coincides or differs 
from the sign of market share changes of other countries. There are five possible 
qualifications of competitive threat: 
 
• Direct threat: If a given country witnesses a decrease in its market share for a 
given product and the market share of China for that product increases, China is 
assumed to pose a direct competitive threat for that country with respect to the 
given product. 
• Partial threat: The given country and China both increase their market share for 
a given product but the market share of China increases faster. 
• No threat: The given country and China both increase their market share for a 
given product and the market share of China increases slower. 
• China under threat: The given country witnesses an increase in its market share 
whereas China loses market share. 
• Mutual withdrawal: The given country and China both witness decreasing 
market shares for a given product. 
 
Lall and Albaladejo (2004) concede hat there is a substantial caveat in inferring a 
competitive threat from combinations of changes in market shares for a given product. If 
the economically more developed countries relocate labour-intensive activities to China, 
as is the case for a number of Asian neighbours, the exports of China may increase at the 
expense of its neighbours. However, the neighbouring countries actually increase their 
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competitive advantage as well as exports of intermediates; design and marketing 
activities and dividends.    
Being aware of the limitations, table A.1 (appendix) shows, for the countries of the 
reference group in the period 1994-2000, the potential competitive threat of China, in the 
terms of Lall and Albaladejo (2004), considering the share of the five possible market 
share change combinations in the total number of commodities at the highest level of 
product detail. 
 
For most countries the percentage of commodities for which China can be considered as a 
direct threat increased over the period considered. Actually the percentage in 2000 clearly 
exceeds the percentage of previous years for most countries. Somewhat in contrast with 
this general trend the percentage of commodities under direct threat hardly changed or 
even decreased for Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Poland and the United States.   
Considering eight Asian countries, Lall and Albaladejo (2004) also find that the 
percentage of commodities under direct threat decreased over the period 1990-2000 for 
Hong Kong, although the percentage for 2000, i.e. 88.9% found by them is substantially 
higher than the percentage reported in table 4, i.e. 23%. This can probably be explained 
by the fact that Lall and Albaladejo work at a higher level of product aggregation, i.e. 
SITC three-digit. Given the high degree of product heterogeneity within three-digit 
classes an analysis at a lower level of disaggregation seems warranted.  
For the year 2000 Germany, France, Sweden, Belgium, Italy and the UK top the list of 
countries with respect to the percentage of commodities under direct threat. 
The relationship between similarity in exports, as proxied by the RCA reported in the 
previous section, and the percentage of commodities under direct threat apparently 
weakened over the period 1994-2000. Whereas in 1994 the correlation between the 
correlation of China’s RCA and other countries’ RCA and the percentage of commodities 
under direct threat was 0.24 it turned negative in 1995 to reach -0.48 in 2000.  
This seems to suggest that similarity in RCA is not a good proxy for the degree of a 
country’s competitive threat as most EU countries had a negative correlation between 
their RCA and China’s RCA but appear to have witnessed a direct threat from China for a 
large share of their commodities.  
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 The dynamics of export market shares is traditionally examined with a shift share or 
constant market share analysis.   
In a shift share analysis the growth in the market share of a country with respect to the 
world or a reference group of countries is decomposed into a number of effects (e.g. 
Richardson 1971; Barff and Knight 1988): 
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The first term of the right-hand side reflects how much the overall market share of 
country I would have changed if the commodity mix (shares of different SITC 
commodities) would have been fixed. As such it can be considered as a competitiveness 
effect
3
. The second term measures the change in country I’s overall market share 
explained by a change in the commodity mix of exports of the reference group. This 
commodity mix effect therefore reveals whether a country is specialized in commodities 
that are becoming more important or in commodities that are losing shares in the total 
market value. The last term is an interaction effect revealing the extent to which a country 
is moving towards commodities that gain market shares or moving out of activities that 
are less promising due to decreasing overall market shares and can therefore be 
considered as a market adaptation effect (e.g. Fagerberg and Solie 1987). 
Shift share analysis is often performed with changes over a given period of a number of 
years. Chern, Wilson and Chuan (2002) argue that if the commodity mix changes 
                                                 
3 This effect is often called the market share effect. The interpretation of this effect as an indicator of 
“competitiveness” is indeed open to question (e.g. Michel 2005). However, in this paper this effect is 
considered as a proxy for competitiveness and therefore will be labeled as such in the full knowledge of its 
limitation as well as the more general caveats of shift share analysis (e.g. Chern, Wilson and Chuan 2002).  
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substantially over the period considered this can result in biased effects. They therefore 
opt for a dynamic shift share analysis (e.g. Barff and Knight 1988) considering changes 
over one year, thereby automatically updating the commodity mix effect each year. 
 
Weiss and Shanwen (2003) applied a shift share analysis to six ASEAN countries. Using 
the share effect as a measure of competitiveness they find that the ASIAN countries 
considered have been exposed to increasing competition from China, in the United States 
and Japan. 
 
Given the potentially large changes in the commodity mix, changes in market shares are 
computed and decomposed for each year in the period 1993-2000. Commodities are again 
considered at the highest possible level of detail (i.e. 2191 commodities at the five-digit 
SITC level 144 commodities at the four-digit SITC level). Only exports to North America, 
Europe and Asia are considered. 
 
The results for each individual country and each year are shown in table A.2 in the 
appendix. In Table 4, average annual effects over the period considered for each of the 
three shift share effects is shown, ranked in decreasing order for each effect
4
. The last two 
columns give the ranking of the relative growth in market shares. As can be seen in table 
A.2 the average annual effects hide substantial variation over the years. Computing the 
share effects over a longer period of time (e.g. five years) as is often done, is likely to 
overlook this annual variation.  
 
China clearly had the highest positive competitiveness effect, with an annual growth of 
0.5% in its market share. However, China is second to last with respect to the commodity 
mix effect and the adaptation effect is only moderately positive. The US, Spain, Ireland, 
Hungary, Finland and the UK are the only countries for which all three effects, on 
average, are positive for the period 1994-2000. Especially the United States seems to 
have been performing rather well with the second highest positive competitiveness and 
                                                 
4 Though these results are not entirely comparable to the estimations by Michel (2005) who performs an 
analysis for 62 destination countries and 72 products over the respective periods 1991-1997 and 1997-2001, 
overall the results seem fairly similar. 
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the highest positive commodity mix effect. As shown in table 1, more recently (1999-
2004) the United States witnessed a substantial loss in its world market share.  
 
Table 4: Average annual shift share effects and relative growth market shares 
(1994-2000) 
country Competitiveness country Commodity mix country Adaptation country Rel. growth
CHINA 0.47 US 0.14 HONG KONG 0.04 HUNGARY 16.45
US 0.16 JAPAN 0.09 IRELAND 0.03 IRELAND 10.77
CANADA 0.10 IRELAND 0.04 JAPAN 0.02 CHINA 9.03
SPAIN 0.09 SWEDEN 0.04 CHINA 0.01 POLAND 7.40
IRELAND 0.08 UK 0.03 UK 0.01 FINLAND 2.85
HUNGARY 0.07 FINLAND 0.01 US 0.01 SPAIN 2.43
POLAND 0.06 NL 0.00 HUNGARY 0.00 US 2.14
FINLAND 0.01 HUNGARY 0.00 DENMARK 0.00 CANADA 1.98
UK 0.00 DENMARK 0.00 FINLAND 0.00 UK 0.73
BELGIUM -0.01 AUSTRIA -0.01 BELGIUM 0.00 SWEDEN 0.47
SWEDEN -0.02 FRANCE -0.01 POLAND 0.00 BELGIUM -0.82
AUSTRIA -0.02 POLAND -0.01 NL 0.00 FRANCE -1.08
DENMARK -0.02 BELGIUM -0.03 AUSTRIA 0.00 HONG KONG -1.15
FRANCE -0.05 CANADA -0.03 SPAIN -0.01 GERMANY -1.29
HONG KONG -0.07 SPAIN -0.03 CANADA -0.01 AUSTRIA -1.47
ITALY -0.08 HONG KONG -0.04 SWEDEN -0.02 NL -2.01
NL -0.08 GERMANY -0.05 ITALY -0.02 DENMARK -2.10
GERMANY -0.13 CHINA -0.06 GERMANY -0.03 ITALY -2.65
JAPAN -0.57 ITALY -0.10 FRANCE -0.03 JAPAN -2.72  
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD (2002) 
 
Considering relative growth of market shares, Hungary and Ireland actually outperformed 
China with Poland following at close distance.  
Japan witnessed the highest drop in its market share, explained by a negative 
competitiveness effect, as both its commodity mix and adaptation effect was negative. 
France and Germany are the only countries for which all three shift share effects are 
negative on average.  
Michel (2005) decomposed market shares by destination country. Over the period 1991-
1997 he found that for most EU countries the world export market share dropped due to 
the fact that a very large part of their trade is intra-EU and that the share of the EU in 
world trade decreased from 44.42% in 1991 to 37.25% in 1997.  The share slightly 
increased to 37.44% in 2001, allowing the EU countries to recover part of the lost market 
shares.    
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V. Econometric Estimation 
 
 
In this section the results of an econometric estimation of the impact of China on the 
export shares of other countries are discussed. For each country the competitiveness 
effect at the commodity level (CEj, t), computed in the previous section, is regressed on 
trade partners’ competitiveness effects for the same commodity.In addition to the main 
G7 countries China, Hong Kong, Hungary and Poland are considered individually to 
estimate the impact of these emerging economies.  The EU15 countries that do not belong 
to the G7 are grouped in a EU rest variable. In addition, the growth in the exports of the 
given commodity in Europe, North America and Asia are considered as control variables 
and time dummies take into account common annual shocks:   
 
, , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , ,
, ,
j t China China j t Hong Kong Hong Kong j t Hungary Hungary j t Poland Poland j t
France France j t Germany Germany j t Italy Italy j t UK UK j t US US j t
EUrest EUrest j t Europ
CE CE CE CE CE
CE CE CE CE CE
CE
α α α α
α α α α α
α α
= + + +
+ + + + +
+ + , , , , , ,
2000
,1995
e Europe j t America America j t Asia Asia j t
t t j tt
Exports Exports Exports
D
α α
α ε=
∆ + ∆ + ∆
+ +∑
 
The specification is estimated with fixed effects, i.e. for each country a panel is estimated 
with the individual commodities, as unit of observations, having their specific intercept.  
An F-test indicates whether the assumption of commodity-specific intercepts can be 
rejected in favour of a specification with a common intercept for all commodities. 
The estimation results are reported in table 5. The last row shows whether for the given 
country a fixed effects (FE) specification is rejected in favour of a plain OLS 
specification, in which case the latter results are reported.   
 
Although the impact of China’s competitiveness on other countries’ competitiveness is 
found to be negative for twelve out of fifteen countries considered, the impact is only 
statistically significant for six countries: Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the UK, Hong Kong and 
the United States. The highest negative impact can moreover be found for countries who 
have witnessed positive overall share growth like Ireland and the United States. On the 
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other hand, Denmark, Italy and Hong Kong were among the countries with the highest 
relative market share loss in the period 1994-2000 (see table 4)  
The impact of the US is significantly negative for ten countries and the impact of Hong 
Kong significantly negative for nine countries. The impact of other countries provides a 
more mixed pattern, e.g. a significant and substantial negative impact of Poland on 
Germany and of France on the United States.      
Japan, for which no results are reported in table 5, apparently witnessed a significant 
negative impact of all country (groups) considered in the estimation 
 
A striking result of the estimation is that four out of the six countries for which a 
significant negative impact of China is found (i.e. Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Hong 
Kong) are closest to China in the common space in figure 3, which reveals the similarity 
in trade patterns. This seems to suggest a closer link between the negative impact of 
China as estimated and similarity in trade specialization than between similarity and 
the % of products considered a direct threat as shown in table A.1.  
 
Table A.1 suggests that the competitive threat of China increased over the years. Taking 
the possibility of time variant slope coefficients into account, the specification has been 
re-estimated by interacting the China variable with  the time dummies. These estimations 
resulted in a variating combination of countries with statistically significant negative 
coefficients for the following countries: 
 
1995: Austria, Italy and United States 
1996: Germany, Italy, Hungary and United States 
1997: Denmark and Italy 
1998: Belgium, United Kingdom and Hong Kong 
1999: Finland, Hong Kong, Ireland, Poland, United Kingdom and United States 
2000: Denmark, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States 
 
Table 5: Impact of major countries on export shares of reference group countries 
(1994-2000) 
 
 AU BE DK FR DE IE IT NL 
China 0.01 -0.04 -0.02*** -0.04 -0.06 -0.21** -0.15*** 0.03 
Hong Kong -0.01 -0.07* -0.02** -0.15 -0.09 -0.16*** -0.06*** -0.04 
Hungary -0.09 -0.25** -0.02 -0.21 -0.33 -0.14 -0.16 -0.25* 
Poland 0.08* -0.14 -0.01 -0.04 -0.53* -0.14 0.16 -0.07 
France 0.01 -0.08* 0.004  0.004 -0.21*** -0.04 0.03 
Germany 0.01 0.12 -0.01 -0.01  -0.05 0.08* -0.001 
Italy 0.08** -0.05 0.01 -0.09 0.32** -0.07  0.08 
UK 0.04 0.03 -0.01* -0.11* -0.06 -0.15** 0.03 0.03 
US 0.00 0.01 -0.004 -0.23*** -0.13** -0.17*** -0.04 -0.10*** 
EU (rest) 0.00 -0.003 -0.003 -0.07 0.13 -0.10** 0.05 -0.06* 
R2 (adj.) 0.07 0.21 0.03 0.19 0.19 0.12 0.16 0.11 
Specification OLS FE OLS OLS FE FE OLS FE 
  
 
 ES SE UK CH HK HU PO US 
China 0.08** -0.13 -0.14***  -0.19** -0.01 -0.03 -0.37*** 
Hong Kong -0.01 -0.09** -0.11* -0.09***  -0.03** -0.002 -0.42*** 
Hungary -0.12* -0.33** 0.003 -0.03 -0.16  -0.04 -0.33 
Poland 0.22 -0.12** -0.23 -0.19 -0.14 -0.04  -0.62*** 
France 0.01 -0.01 -0.16** -0.04* -0.30*** -0.01 -0.002 -0.81*** 
Germany 0.14*** 0.03 -0.004 -0.16 -0.10 -0.17 -0.02* -0.26* 
Italy 0.26** 0.08 0.07 -0.09* -0.21*** -0.02 0.04** -0.22 
UK 0.09 -0.06  -0.07** -0.12 -0.02 -0.02** -0.40*** 
US 0.06* -0.04** -0.18*** -0.05*** -0.18** -0.01* -0.01*  
EU (rest) 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05** -0.16*** -0.05*** -0.01 -0.28*** 
R2 (adj.) 0.26 0.11 0.10 0.31 0.21 0.22 0.02 0.39 
Specification OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE FE FE 
  
Source: Own estimations based on data from OECD (2002). *, **, *** denotes significance at 
respectively 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. Columns with OLS for specification report results of a plain OLS 
estimation (common intercept), columns with FE reports results of a fixed effects estimation 
(commodity-specific intercepts). Control variables and time dummies are not reported. 
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Overall these results are in line with the time-invariant slope estimations reported in table 
5, with some indications that in the most recent years of the period considered (1999 and 
2000) more countries are affeccted by China's increased competitiveness. The negative 
impact of China on Hong Kong was apparently especially tangible in the two years 
following the 1997 Asian crisis. 
 
Given the increased importance of foreign outsourcing, the estimation of changes in 
market shares at the same five-digit level may osbcure the positive impact of increased 
exports of a trade partner on its imports and thus the exports by other countries of 
intermediate commodities. To estimate the possible impact of exports in five-digit 
commodities on trade in intermediates, the trade variables have been interacted with 
dummies at the SITC three-digit level, i.e. for each five-digit commodity the change in 
market shares of trade partners at the five-digit SITC level is interacted with 1 if the 
given commodity has the same SITC three-digit code (but not the same five-digit SITC 
code) otherwise by 0. Summarizing the results of this estimation by the significant 
effects: 
 
China: Poland (-) 
Hong Kong: France (+), Poland (-) and United States (+) 
Poland: China (-) and Hong Kong (-)  
France: Hong Kong (+) 
Germany: Ireland (+), Netherlands (-) and United Kingdom (+) 
Italy: Poland (+) 
United States: Denmark (+), Hong Kong (+), Ireland (+) and United Kingdom (+) 
United Kingdom: Finland (+) and France (+) 
EU (rest): China (-), France (+), Germany (+) and United Kingdom (+)  
 
In contrast with the effects reported in table 5 most of the significant coefficients are 
positive, although this only seems to apply to the most developed countries, e.g. the 
positive impact of the United States on four countries. The only significant effect found 
for China is the negative impact of China's change in market share at the five-digit level 
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on Poland's changes in the market shares of commodities with the same three-digit SITC 
code. Poland also has a negative impact on China and Hong Kong. These results indicate 
the importance to account for a possible positive outsourcing effect though so far this 
does not seem to apply to China. 
 
The regression specification used so far does not account for the endogeneity of many of 
the right-hand side variables. 
Therefore all individual country equations have been estimated simultaneously using 
GMM (TSP 4.5). The lagged values of the variables are used as instruments and a mask 
matrix specifies which of the instruments are used for which equations. In table 6 the 
significant effects are reported. Far less coefficients appear to be significant when the 
endogeneity is taken into account. Moreover the effects in many cases also have a 
different sign. China’s competitiveness is not found to have any significant impact at all 
in any of the countries considered and the impact of the United States is more ambiguous, 
i.e. positive for France and Ireland and negative for Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom.  
 
Table 6: Impact of major countries on export shares of reference group countries 
(1994-2000)- GMM simultaneous equations estimation  
 
 BE FR DE IE IT UK US 
China        
Hong Kong        
Hungary        
Poland        
France   4.47***   2.04**  
Germany -2.79*** 4.00***  4.90***  -5.38*** -1.84* 
Italy    5.19***  -2.15**  
UK  9.15*** -6.33***  -2.21**  -7.35*** 
US  1.91* -5.36*** 2.23** -4.57*** -7.37***  
EU (rest)        
  
Source: Own estimations based on data from OECD (2002). *, **, *** denotes significance at 
respectively 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. The table reports results from a Generalized Method of Moments 
estimation of the system of simultaneous country equations. 
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VI. Conclusions 
 
 
The surge in China's exports since the beginning of the 1990s is increasingly considered 
as a threat to the welfare of other countries. The rise in the country's share in world 
market exports is seen as an indication of a fall in the international competitiveness of 
other countries. As China's trade performance is viewed as a result of its unfair policies 
(e.g. undervalued exchange rate)à calls for protectionism are resounding more loudly 
everyday in the EU and the United States. 
 
As already pointed out by Krugman (1994), talking about the international 
competitiveness of nations the same way as talking about the international 
competitiveness of corporations does not make much sense. From a theoretical 
perspective changes in countries' share in world markets cannot simply be taken as 
evidence of decreasing competitiveness as these changes could very well reflect a shift 
towards a more efficient allocation of resources.      
 
However, trade theories depend on a number of very restricting assumptions, e.g. perfect 
market competition. Lall and Albaladejo (2004) have argued that countries can actually 
improve national welfare through policies that remedy or play off market failures, e.g. by 
capitalizing on the monopoly power of domestic firms in foreign markets.   
Moreover, Samuelson (2004) considered a Ricardian theoretical framework to show that a 
country (e.g. the United States) may actually be negatively affected in the long-term by an 
exogenous productivity gain in another country (e.g. China).  
In this paper changes in market shares have been used to proxy the competitiveness of a 
group of countries, in the full awareness of the its coarseness. The competitiveness effects, 
computed from a dynamic shift share analysis (i.e. computing changes for each year of a 
given period rather than computing changes over the entire period) have been used to 
estimate the impact of China on the other countries.  
 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) indices, computed at the highest level of 
product detail (2191 SITC five-digit products and 144 SITC four-digit products) for a 
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group of nineteen countries suggests that China's trade specialization pattern is most 
similar to that of Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Hong Kong. Considering, as Lall and 
Albaladejo (2004), the fact that for a given commodity China's market share increases 
whereas that of a given other country decreases as an indication of China posing a threat 
to the given country for the given commodity, reveals that overall the percentage of 
commodities for which China can be said to pose a competitive threat increased over the 
period 1994-2000.  
For the group of nineteen countries there is however a negative correlation between 
computed RCA indices and the percentage of commodities for which China poses a threat. 
 
Looking at the results of the dynamic shift share analysis, China witnessed the highest 
average annual growth (0.42 %) in its share in world exports for the period 1994-2000, 
followed by the United States, Canada, Spain, Ireland, Hungary and Poland. In terms of 
relative growth, Hungary and Ireland have actually done better than China.  
The growth of China's world market share seems for the largest part explained by the 
competitiveness effects. China's commodity mix effect is, just after Italy, the most 
negative of all countries considered (-0.6 %) suggesting that the mix of China's export 
products is so far slowing down the overall increase in its world market share. 
 
Panel estimations of single country equations suggest a statistically significant negative 
impact of China’s competitiveness on Denmark, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. However, taking into account the endogeneity of right-
hand side variables using a GMM estimation of simultaneous equations the impact of 
China is no longer significant for any of the countries considered and the impact of other 
countries, e.g. the United States, is more ambiguous than in the single equation 
estimations. 
 
These results seem to suggest that- even abstracting from the caveats of considering 
changes in market shares as an indicator of changes in international competitiveness- the 
impact of China on most of the countries considered has not been substantial so far and 
that the rise of China as a world exporter is immoderately considered as a problem for 
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developed countries. If international trade competition of nations makes any sense at all it 
is still predominantly among developed countries.  
 
Fortune cookies may foretell a more bleak future when China would witness the type of 
exogenous productivity gains pointed out by Samuelson (2004).  
Lall and Albaladejo (2004) found that China’s share in high tech products is increasing 
substantially. Kwan (2002) contemplates the possibility of a leapfrog scenario with China 
jumping from specialization in low-tech products to specialization in high-tech products 
without struggling through medium-tech products, e.g. through foreign technology 
transfer, but considers such a scenario to be rather unlikely given the lack of human 
capital.     
 
Krugman is right when he argues that many people focus on international 
competitiveness to divert the attention from bad domestic policies. A more protectionist 
stance of developed countries with respect to China seems the last thing needed for a 
successful conclusion of the ongoing WTO Round. The argument that China is not 
following all “free trade” rules is undoubtedly well-grounded but sounds very canting 
coming from most developed countries.  
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APPENDIX  Table A.1: China’s potential competitive threat based on market share 
change combinations 
Country Year % direct threat % partial threat % no threat % mutual withdrawal % China under threat
AUSTRIA 1994 0.47 0.19 0.05 0.19 0.11
AUSTRIA 1995 0.26 0.30 0.17 0.09 0.18
AUSTRIA 1996 0.34 0.13 0.06 0.19 0.27
AUSTRIA 1997 0.40 0.24 0.11 0.14 0.10
AUSTRIA 1998 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.29
AUSTRIA 1999 0.31 0.19 0.10 0.16 0.24
AUSTRIA 2000 0.53 0.26 0.06 0.08 0.07
BELGIUM 1994 0.33 0.21 0.06 0.10 0.29
BELGIUM 1995 0.40 0.23 0.10 0.14 0.13
BELGIUM 1996 0.23 0.15 0.06 0.20 0.36
BELGIUM 1997 0.45 0.24 0.07 0.11 0.13
BELGIUM 1998 0.16 0.18 0.10 0.27 0.29
BELGIUM 1999 0.27 0.15 0.07 0.34 0.17
BELGIUM 2000 0.56 0.20 0.09 0.07 0.08
CANADA 1994 0.28 0.15 0.03 0.07 0.46
CANADA 1995 0.28 0.44 0.04 0.14 0.11
CANADA 1996 0.18 0.15 0.04 0.40 0.23
CANADA 1997 0.12 0.56 0.09 0.04 0.19
CANADA 1998 0.19 0.12 0.04 0.19 0.46
CANADA 1999 0.09 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.57
CANADA 2000 0.23 0.56 0.07 0.06 0.08
DENMARK 1994 0.38 0.27 0.10 0.08 0.17
DENMARK 1995 0.22 0.33 0.15 0.12 0.18
DENMARK 1996 0.39 0.18 0.09 0.19 0.16
DENMARK 1997 0.54 0.15 0.07 0.17 0.07
DENMARK 1998 0.28 0.20 0.11 0.23 0.19
DENMARK 1999 0.29 0.21 0.11 0.17 0.21
DENMARK 2000 0.53 0.21 0.14 0.07 0.04
FINLAND 1994 0.22 0.37 0.16 0.04 0.20
FINLAND 1995 0.22 0.32 0.17 0.10 0.18
FINLAND 1996 0.24 0.25 0.08 0.22 0.21
FINLAND 1997 0.36 0.30 0.07 0.13 0.14
FINLAND 1998 0.17 0.20 0.07 0.28 0.28
FINLAND 1999 0.37 0.11 0.07 0.29 0.16
FINLAND 2000 0.43 0.44 0.04 0.06 0.03
FRANCE 1994 0.37 0.20 0.06 0.22 0.14
FRANCE 1995 0.26 0.42 0.08 0.10 0.15
FRANCE 1996 0.27 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.28
FRANCE 1997 0.39 0.26 0.05 0.20 0.10
FRANCE 1998 0.23 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.34
FRANCE 1999 0.32 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.17
FRANCE 2000 0.64 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.10
GERMANY 1994 0.30 0.29 0.03 0.11 0.27
GERMANY 1995 0.25 0.46 0.05 0.10 0.15
GERMANY 1996 0.37 0.12 0.02 0.24 0.26
GERMANY 1997 0.54 0.18 0.03 0.13 0.11
GERMANY 1998 0.14 0.24 0.08 0.13 0.42
GERMANY 1999 0.34 0.19 0.04 0.31 0.12
GERMANY 2000 0.65 0.17 0.02 0.10 0.06
HONG KONG 1994 0.47 0.29 0.04 0.07 0.13
HONG KONG 1995 0.35 0.26 0.09 0.15 0.15
HONG KONG 1996 0.25 0.16 0.07 0.19 0.33
HONG KONG 1997 0.39 0.37 0.05 0.11 0.08
HONG KONG 1998 0.38 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.24
HONG KONG 1999 0.30 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.33
HONG KONG 2000 0.23 0.47 0.15 0.03 0.12
HUNGARY 1994 0.28 0.22 0.27 0.08 0.15
HUNGARY 1995 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.17
HUNGARY 1996 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.16 0.27
HUNGARY 1997 0.16 0.19 0.42 0.06 0.18
HUNGARY 1998 0.09 0.27 0.25 0.09 0.30
HUNGARY 1999 0.28 0.24 0.14 0.09 0.24
HUNGARY 2000 0.35 0.40 0.16 0.02 0.06
IRELAND 1994 0.25 0.38 0.17 0.04 0.16
IRELAND 1995 0.17 0.37 0.20 0.09 0.17
IRELAND 1996 0.10 0.30 0.23 0.09 0.28
IRELAND 1997 0.29 0.30 0.17 0.05 0.19
IRELAND 1998 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.29
IRELAND 1999 0.16 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.42
IRELAND 2000 0.22 0.53 0.16 0.04 0.05  
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Country Year % direct threat % partial threat % no threat % mutual withdrawal % China under threat
ITALY 1994 0.54 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.10
ITALY 1995 0.24 0.41 0.07 0.08 0.21
ITALY 1996 0.19 0.23 0.11 0.08 0.39
ITALY 1997 0.62 0.15 0.03 0.14 0.07
ITALY 1998 0.25 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.21
ITALY 1999 0.42 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.15
ITALY 2000 0.54 0.27 0.05 0.06 0.08
JAPAN 1994 0.35 0.31 0.03 0.20 0.11
JAPAN 1995 0.58 0.24 0.02 0.10 0.06
JAPAN 1996 0.44 0.10 0.01 0.38 0.07
JAPAN 1997 0.46 0.30 0.03 0.11 0.10
JAPAN 1998 0.44 0.05 0.01 0.40 0.09
JAPAN 1999 0.16 0.34 0.09 0.07 0.34
JAPAN 2000 0.22 0.53 0.07 0.04 0.14
NL 1994 0.48 0.21 0.04 0.16 0.10
NL 1995 0.27 0.37 0.09 0.10 0.16
NL 1996 0.27 0.20 0.13 0.21 0.20
NL 1997 0.44 0.28 0.06 0.13 0.09
NL 1998 0.25 0.26 0.05 0.21 0.22
NL 1999 0.22 0.24 0.10 0.17 0.27
NL 2000 0.53 0.22 0.09 0.07 0.10
POLAND 1994 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.14
POLAND 1995 0.15 0.28 0.25 0.06 0.25
POLAND 1996 0.19 0.18 0.23 0.13 0.27
POLAND 1997 0.29 0.31 0.15 0.11 0.13
POLAND 1998 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.10 0.42
POLAND 1999 0.28 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.20
POLAND 2000 0.28 0.43 0.18 0.03 0.07
SPAIN 1994 0.17 0.22 0.18 0.04 0.39
SPAIN 1995 0.14 0.52 0.13 0.07 0.15
SPAIN 1996 0.09 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.45
SPAIN 1997 0.48 0.22 0.08 0.08 0.14
SPAIN 1998 0.11 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.42
SPAIN 1999 0.23 0.21 0.07 0.32 0.16
SPAIN 2000 0.36 0.48 0.06 0.05 0.05
SWEDEN 1994 0.28 0.23 0.09 0.24 0.16
SWEDEN 1995 0.26 0.34 0.16 0.11 0.14
SWEDEN 1996 0.16 0.22 0.13 0.23 0.26
SWEDEN 1997 0.47 0.17 0.04 0.24 0.09
SWEDEN 1998 0.28 0.11 0.07 0.32 0.22
SWEDEN 1999 0.28 0.30 0.05 0.25 0.11
SWEDEN 2000 0.60 0.23 0.06 0.08 0.04
UK 1994 0.22 0.37 0.08 0.11 0.22
UK 1995 0.36 0.34 0.05 0.12 0.13
UK 1996 0.18 0.25 0.11 0.11 0.35
UK 1997 0.21 0.37 0.15 0.11 0.16
UK 1998 0.32 0.13 0.06 0.29 0.21
UK 1999 0.37 0.18 0.04 0.21 0.19
UK 2000 0.54 0.26 0.05 0.08 0.08
US 1994 0.38 0.26 0.05 0.18 0.13
US 1995 0.57 0.17 0.04 0.12 0.11
US 1996 0.18 0.26 0.09 0.20 0.27
US 1997 0.25 0.37 0.11 0.05 0.22
US 1998 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.23 0.20
US 1999 0.28 0.33 0.06 0.13 0.20
US 2000 0.32 0.42 0.06 0.08 0.12  
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD (2002). 
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Table A.2: Shift share effects 1994-2000 
country year Competitiveness Commodity mix Interaction Growth share Relative growth Share
CHINA 1994 0.703 0.023 0.030 0.757 19.78 4.58
FINLAND 1994 0.102 0.012 -0.002 0.113 11.88 1.06
IRELAND 1994 0.082 0.024 0.007 0.112 11.15 1.12
POLAND 1994 0.045 0.010 -0.005 0.050 9.73 0.56
SPAIN 1994 0.172 -0.011 -0.001 0.161 7.06 2.43
HUNGARY 1994 0.017 0.004 -0.001 0.020 6.60 0.32
UK 1994 0.341 0.021 0.016 0.378 6.01 6.67
SWEDEN 1994 0.019 0.033 -0.011 0.042 1.93 2.20
CANADA 1994 0.076 -0.008 -0.022 0.046 1.42 3.27
BELGIUM 1994 0.048 0.007 0.008 0.063 1.41 4.51
GERMANY 1994 0.236 0.013 -0.031 0.218 1.37 16.15
DENMARK 1994 0.012 0.001 -0.012 0.001 0.09 1.10
HONG KONG 1994 -0.101 0.029 0.001 -0.071 -1.38 5.06
FRANCE 1994 -0.061 -0.039 -0.027 -0.127 -1.63 7.68
JAPAN 1994 -0.624 0.119 0.065 -0.440 -2.56 16.71
US 1994 -0.235 -0.179 0.022 -0.392 -2.81 13.57
AUSTRIA 1994 -0.099 0.009 -0.003 -0.093 -5.00 1.77
ITALY 1994 -0.327 -0.074 -0.035 -0.436 -5.52 7.46
NL 1994 -0.408 0.006 0.001 -0.402 -9.62 3.77
POLAND 1995 0.114 0.002 -0.012 0.105 18.60 0.67
FINLAND 1995 0.079 0.095 0.003 0.177 16.64 1.24
IRELAND 1995 0.072 0.008 0.010 0.090 8.05 1.21
NL 1995 0.197 0.092 -0.005 0.284 7.51 4.06
SPAIN 1995 0.207 -0.052 -0.006 0.149 6.13 2.58
SWEDEN 1995 0.038 0.088 -0.015 0.112 5.10 2.31
CHINA 1995 0.382 -0.190 0.034 0.227 4.95 4.81
HUNGARY 1995 0.017 -0.003 0.001 0.015 4.74 0.34
ITALY 1995 0.366 -0.069 -0.040 0.257 3.44 7.72
DENMARK 1995 0.042 0.005 -0.010 0.037 3.39 1.14
FRANCE 1995 0.313 -0.081 -0.022 0.211 2.75 7.89
GERMANY 1995 0.374 0.014 0.003 0.391 2.42 16.54
AUSTRIA 1995 0.002 0.021 -0.001 0.022 1.24 1.79
BELGIUM 1995 0.014 0.021 -0.005 0.030 0.68 4.54
UK 1995 0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.005 0.07 6.68
CANADA 1995 -0.024 -0.021 -0.017 -0.062 -1.88 3.21
HONG KONG 1995 -0.122 -0.124 0.031 -0.216 -4.26 4.84
JAPAN 1995 -1.174 0.186 0.030 -0.959 -5.74 15.75
US 1995 -0.901 0.009 0.015 -0.876 -6.46 12.70
IRELAND 1996 0.119 0.033 0.021 0.174 14.34 1.38
SPAIN 1996 0.243 0.024 -0.013 0.254 9.83 2.84
POLAND 1996 0.060 -0.008 -0.003 0.049 7.28 0.72
SWEDEN 1996 0.146 0.024 -0.021 0.149 6.44 2.46
UK 1996 0.386 0.044 -0.001 0.428 6.41 7.11
ITALY 1996 0.382 0.092 0.001 0.475 6.16 8.19
US 1996 0.518 0.107 0.007 0.632 4.98 13.33
HONG KONG 1996 0.105 -0.009 -0.002 0.094 1.94 4.93
HUNGARY 1996 0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.004 1.29 0.34
CANADA 1996 0.065 -0.012 -0.019 0.033 1.03 3.24
BELGIUM 1996 0.022 -0.035 0.005 -0.008 -0.18 4.53
CHINA 1996 0.027 -0.056 0.012 -0.017 -0.36 4.79
FRANCE 1996 -0.061 0.035 -0.005 -0.031 -0.39 7.86
DENMARK 1996 -0.037 0.023 -0.002 -0.016 -1.40 1.12
FINLAND 1996 -0.017 -0.028 0.010 -0.035 -2.81 1.20
AUSTRIA 1996 -0.048 -0.002 -0.004 -0.053 -2.99 1.74
GERMANY 1996 -0.540 -0.006 0.022 -0.524 -3.17 16.02
NL 1996 -0.098 -0.040 -0.004 -0.142 -3.49 3.92
JAPAN 1996 -1.277 -0.186 -0.003 -1.467 -9.31 14.28
HUNGARY 1997 0.210 -0.001 0.008 0.217 63.27 0.56
CHINA 1997 0.737 0.051 0.026 0.814 16.98 5.60
IRELAND 1997 0.081 0.051 0.013 0.145 10.49 1.53
US 1997 0.838 0.266 -0.007 1.097 8.23 14.43
CANADA 1997 0.198 -0.022 -0.004 0.172 5.32 3.41
UK 1997 0.223 0.059 0.023 0.306 4.30 7.41
POLAND 1997 0.009 -0.011 -0.003 -0.005 -0.75 0.71
HONG KONG 1997 -0.063 0.020 0.004 -0.039 -0.80 4.89
AUSTRIA 1997 -0.002 -0.022 -0.001 -0.025 -1.41 1.71
SPAIN 1997 -0.012 -0.040 -0.007 -0.059 -2.08 2.78
FRANCE 1997 -0.224 0.019 -0.008 -0.213 -2.71 7.65
FINLAND 1997 -0.014 -0.007 -0.013 -0.034 -2.85 1.17
JAPAN 1997 -0.392 -0.013 -0.006 -0.412 -2.88 13.87
BELGIUM 1997 -0.094 -0.040 0.003 -0.131 -2.90 4.40
NL 1997 -0.133 0.014 -0.007 -0.126 -3.23 3.79
GERMANY 1997 -0.459 -0.143 0.001 -0.601 -3.75 15.42
SWEDEN 1997 -0.151 0.005 -0.003 -0.150 -6.09 2.31
DENMARK 1997 -0.097 -0.011 0.001 -0.108 -9.61 1.01  
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country year Competitiveness Commodity mix Interaction Growth share Relative growth Share
HUNGARY 1998 0.115 0.011 0.000 0.126 22.54 0.69
IRELAND 1998 0.122 0.100 0.072 0.294 19.23 1.82
POLAND 1998 0.093 -0.019 0.003 0.077 10.80 0.79
GERMANY 1998 0.598 0.132 -0.071 0.659 4.27 16.08
US 1998 0.250 0.307 0.000 0.556 3.86 14.98
AUSTRIA 1998 0.060 0.004 -0.008 0.056 3.27 1.77
FRANCE 1998 0.126 0.186 -0.061 0.250 3.27 7.90
FINLAND 1998 0.021 0.021 -0.005 0.037 3.18 1.21
SWEDEN 1998 0.014 0.079 -0.029 0.064 2.78 2.37
SPAIN 1998 0.093 -0.002 -0.014 0.076 2.73 2.85
BELGIUM 1998 0.151 -0.018 -0.016 0.117 2.66 4.52
DENMARK 1998 0.000 0.007 -0.008 -0.002 -0.15 1.01
CANADA 1998 -0.043 0.023 0.002 -0.018 -0.52 3.39
HONG KONG 1998 0.084 -0.309 0.157 -0.069 -1.41 4.83
UK 1998 -0.183 0.036 0.035 -0.112 -1.51 7.30
CHINA 1998 0.170 -0.240 -0.019 -0.089 -1.59 5.51
ITALY 1998 0.023 -0.160 -0.023 -0.160 -2.18 7.19
NL 1998 -0.149 -0.044 -0.005 -0.198 -5.23 3.59
JAPAN 1998 -1.544 -0.114 -0.007 -1.665 -12.01 12.20
HUNGARY 1999 0.061 0.013 -0.001 0.073 10.59 0.76
CANADA 1999 0.354 -0.014 -0.004 0.336 9.89 3.73
IRELAND 1999 0.069 0.031 0.068 0.168 9.21 1.99
JAPAN 1999 0.526 0.135 0.007 0.668 5.48 12.87
CHINA 1999 0.263 -0.027 0.007 0.244 4.42 5.76
NL 1999 0.145 0.009 -0.008 0.146 4.05 3.74
DENMARK 1999 0.025 -0.003 0.014 0.037 3.64 1.05
US 1999 0.194 0.162 -0.005 0.350 2.34 15.33
AUSTRIA 1999 0.029 -0.009 -0.003 0.016 0.92 1.78
FRANCE 1999 0.031 0.002 -0.048 -0.014 -0.18 7.89
SPAIN 1999 -0.005 -0.019 -0.012 -0.036 -1.27 2.82
SWEDEN 1999 -0.060 0.024 -0.012 -0.047 -1.99 2.32
BELGIUM 1999 -0.078 -0.027 -0.007 -0.113 -2.49 4.40
GERMANY 1999 -0.344 -0.084 -0.050 -0.477 -2.97 15.60
POLAND 1999 0.006 -0.033 -0.003 -0.030 -3.84 0.76
UK 1999 -0.370 0.032 -0.010 -0.347 -4.75 6.95
ITALY 1999 -0.157 -0.168 -0.032 -0.357 -4.97 6.83
FINLAND 1999 -0.072 -0.022 0.007 -0.087 -7.20 1.12
HONG KONG 1999 -0.619 -0.002 0.091 -0.529 -10.97 4.30
CHINA 2000 1.032 0.052 0.012 1.096 19.03 6.85
POLAND 2000 0.097 -0.018 -0.003 0.076 10.00 0.83
HONG KONG 2000 0.260 0.113 0.006 0.379 8.82 4.67
JAPAN 2000 0.512 0.493 0.023 1.029 7.99 13.90
HUNGARY 2000 0.059 -0.013 0.001 0.047 6.13 0.81
US 2000 0.431 0.280 0.035 0.747 4.87 16.08
IRELAND 2000 -0.011 0.045 0.025 0.058 2.92 2.05
FINLAND 2000 -0.015 0.025 0.002 0.013 1.12 1.13
CANADA 2000 0.091 -0.136 -0.008 -0.052 -1.41 3.68
NL 2000 -0.142 -0.010 0.002 -0.151 -4.04 3.59
SWEDEN 2000 -0.121 0.028 -0.019 -0.113 -4.87 2.21
BELGIUM 2000 -0.131 -0.092 0.007 -0.216 -4.90 4.19
ITALY 2000 -0.158 -0.178 -0.016 -0.352 -5.16 6.48
SPAIN 2000 -0.043 -0.099 -0.010 -0.152 -5.39 2.67
UK 2000 -0.424 0.040 0.006 -0.378 -5.44 6.58
AUSTRIA 2000 -0.064 -0.039 -0.010 -0.113 -6.32 1.67
GERMANY 2000 -0.784 -0.285 -0.051 -1.119 -7.18 14.48
FRANCE 2000 -0.501 -0.163 -0.021 -0.685 -8.68 7.20
DENMARK 2000 -0.088 -0.045 0.020 -0.112 -10.69 0.94  
 
Source: own calculations based on data from OECD (2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
